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Empire: A  Postmodern Theory of Revolution1 
 
Michael Rustin 
 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire. Cambridge Mass and London: 
Harvard University Press. 2000.  
 
At a time when globalisation has become an increasing focus for political 
movements of different kinds - effervescent demonstrations  in the cities 
where congresses take place,  and sustained campaigns for international 
agreements on debt or climate change  -   it is significant that a major treatise 
has appeared which attempts to give a coherent theoretical shape to global 
conflicts.  Empire is a rare thing in the present age, a systematic treatise in 
political theory which sets out  an argument for  revolution.  Much  of its 
interest lies in its systematicity – whether or not one agrees with its 
philosophical presuppositions, or with its socio-historical analysis,  it is 
invaluable to see such an argument being constructed from first principles.  
Just as liberal philosophers like Rawls or Nozick have set out  systematic  
political philosophies  from their  foundational principles of individual rights 
and freedoms, so Hardt and Negri have sought to find  systemic grounds for 
their utopian conception of revolution. For this they have looked to construct 
an ambitious post-Marxist synthesis of ideas whose most important single 
source is the work of Deleuze and Guattari, but which draws also on 
'republican' political theory, Foucault, Spinoza, and Marx. Empire establishes 
a  systematic and  grounded argument for a transformative  view of the 
present historical situation,  from a revolutionary perspective, and one  does 
not have to agree with its arguments  to recognise it as a landmark in political  
theory. 
 
                                            
1
 This review  is to be published  in New Political Economy in November  2002   
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What is ‘Empire’?  This complex idea is Hardt’s and Negri’s summation of the 
present state of world historical development, in terms of its system of 
governance, its mode of production, its forms of socialisation and subjective 
identity, and its potentials for transformation. Hardt and Negri share with – 
indeed take from – Hegel and Marx a teleological theory of historical 
development, in which each new stage of evolution creates the potential for a 
fuller expression of human potential.  They also share with Marx the idea that 
transitions from one stage of development to another are likely to be 
explosive, occasioned by crises and by sudden transformations in popular 
consciousness.  Marx explained this process largely by reference to the 
development of the means of production, and the overcoming of scarcity that 
this made possible. The advance of capitalist forms of production across the 
globe was a transitional stage for Marx in the later emergence of socialist 
forms of life.  Hardt’s and Negri’s analysis also gives priority to the global 
diffusion of capitalism, but they are  less interested in its material than in its 
political, juridical, cultural, and subjective dimensions.  Where for Marx the 
alienation and eventual reclamation of human productive powers were the 
principal issue, for Hardt and Negri the political and subjective dimensions of 
the appropriation of human powers is at least as important.  
 
Hardt’s and Negri’s thinking has been shaped by Foucault and by Deleuze 
and Guattari as well as by Marxist political economy, and they give as much 
attention to changing forms of governmentality as to changing forms of 
production.  ‘The space of imperial sovereignty’, they argue, ‘is smooth’. What 
this means is that the various boundaries and barriers, not least those of 
national sovereignties, are being swept away by global capitalism.  This 
creation of ‘one world’, with no ‘outside’, as they put it, creates a potentially 
unified space in which the liberation of ‘the multitude’  by its own action 
becomes possible. Hardt and Negri seem more anarchist than Marxist in their 
identification of governmental powers, not economic exploitation, as the main 
obstacles to human liberation. ‘Empire’ also signifies an emergent form of 
global governance, but we will consider this later.   
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They   bring together in their  analysis  of Empire  a number of different  
discourses.i   From neo-Marxist political economy is brought an analysis of the 
post-Fordist, post-industrial revolution. The loss of hegemony of industrial 
production, and its partial supercession by an economy based on information 
and affect, is transforming, in the authors’ view, the labour process, and 
creating a much greater potential for mass resistance, and for the 
reappropriation of their own labour power by citizens, than was possible within 
the previous industrial regime.  The argument here is that the ‘virtual’ 
character of much modern production, and  the importance of symbolic 
production, especially the media, invests power in active subjects, and 
thereby  removes it from the owners and controllers of material resources. 
This transformation of the labour process, and the new emphasis within it on 
knowledge and affect (the latter arising from the increased weight of activities 
focused on health, education, social care  in the post-modern economy), 
together with the lessening constraints of time and space central  to 
globalisation, are creating, in Hardt’s and Negri’s view, ‘a new proletariat,’ ‘the 
entire co-operating multitude.’ (p.402) ii  
 
A second strand of Hardt’s  and Negri’s argument derives from their theory of 
the state.   Although the authors insist that they are libertarian  communists, 
and not anarchists (P. 350)  their view of the state is  recognisably an 
anarchist one. Most forms of state power, in their view,  alienate the autonomy 
of subjects, and crush their creative power.  They develop a historical 
argument which  identifies  radical and  conservative poles in Enlightenment 
thinking, and explains how the radical end  of this antithesis – ‘revolutionary 
humanism’ – was defeated, with dire consequences for collective self-
determination.  ‘The revolution of European modernity ran into its Thermidor.’  
(P. 75). Enlightenment  thus  initiated not popular self-rule, but  forms of 
sovereignty external to and ‘other’ than the subjects in whose name sovereign 
states  claimed to govern.  Doctrines of transcendence merely transferred 
authority from one displaced abstraction – God – to another – Man. The mind-
body split instituted by Descartes defeated, in terms of influence,  the  
immanentist doctrine of Spinoza,   and this led to another damaging kind of 
alienation.  The British empiricist tradition,  with Hobbes at its centre, was 
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particularly lethal in its consequences for the idea of creative self-rule, since it 
posited the necessity for the delegation of human powers for the preservation 
of peace and security. Subsequent mitigations of the extremity of this position, 
in Lockean theories of constitutional government constrained by the natural 
rights of citizens, and later in the theory and practice of representative 
democracy, did not in Hardt’s and Negri’s view repair the fundamental flaws of 
this view of sovereignty,  whose essence is that subjects are ruled and do not 
rule themselves.  
 
Empire brings together with this  philosophical critique of sovereignty a 
Foucauldian argument concerning the changes in the forms of  power and 
control which have been exercised over society.  Foucault is one of the most 
important influences on Hardt’s and Negri’s work – they cast much of their 
historical analysis in terms of a ‘genealogy’ of present formations.  They take 
from Foucault in particular the idea of ‘a historical, epochal passage in social 
forms from disciplinary society to the society of control.’ (P.23). Disciplinary 
society is constructed through ‘apparatuses  that produce and regulate 
customs, habits and productive practices.’ This work of control is 
accomplished through disciplinary institutions such as ‘the prison, the factory, 
the asylum, the hospital, the university, the school and so forth.’  They argue 
that this paradigm of power ruled throughout the first phase of capitalist 
accumulation.  By contrast, the society of control is one ‘which develops at the 
far edge of modernity and opens towards the postmodern,’ and is one in 
which ‘mechanisms of command become ever more “democratic,” ever more 
immanent to the social field...' Social control becomes interiorised within 
subjects themselves. It is exercised directly on the minds and bodies of 
subjects, through information systems and welfare practices.iii It thus extends 
well outside ‘the structured sites of social institutions,’ into the fabric of 
everyday life.  This amounts to a form of ‘bio-power’ that regulates life from 
the interior of subjects, a power which  they ‘embrace and reactivate’ from 
their own accord. (P23-4). 
 
There is a parallel – indeed a fusion – between the ‘virtual’  and ‘immanent’ 
properties of labour in the post-industrial economy, and the ‘interiorised’ forms 
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of control of the new kind of governmentality. Hardt and Negri are describing a 
destruction or compression of many previous differences and boundaries.  
Their description of this process is hardly precise – ‘ the increasingly intense 
relationship of mutual implication of all social forces that capitalism has 
pursued throughout its development has now been fully realised.’  But 
whereas earlier Marxist writers such as those of the Frankfurt  School equated 
this ‘real subsumption of labour under capital’ as a one-dimensional and 
potentially totalitarian process,  Hardt and Negri, drawing on Foucault,  take a 
contrary  and more positive view of it.  ‘Civil society is absorbed in the state, 
but the consequence of this is an explosion of the elements that were 
previously coordinated and mediated in civil society.’ Calling on Deleuze and 
Guattari, another important source for them,  they argue that ‘ resistances are 
no longer marginal but active in the centre of a society that opens up in 
networks; the individual points are singularised in a thousand plateaus.’ iv  (P. 
25) The idea that the subjectivisation of power, and the virtualisation of 
production, creates the opportunity for new kinds of immanent resistance, 
connecting unpredictably  and with immense potential  through the ‘rhizomes’ 
of network society, is the essential basis of Hardt’s and Negri’s revolutionary 
optimism. If one puts their account in the framework of complexity theory,v 
they model  a complex but inherently increasingly unstable system, which has 
the potential to tip suddenly  from one alienated kind of equilibrium of control 
to a different potential for  liberation.   
 
Their synthesis of a theory of changing forms of governmentality and 
sovereignty, with their analysis of post-industrial capitalism, allows them to 
see Empire as both a new system of power-relations, and a highly vulnerable 
one. In the latter  more apocalyptic sections of the book, Empire is described 
as a parasitic formation, whose supercession as a global regime only awaits 
the awakening of the multitude to recognition of their immanent powers.  But 
in earlier chapters, the idea of Empire is elaborated in more positive terms, as 
an immanent, emergent concept of global governance.vi Empire was written, 
as its authors explain, after the Gulf War and before the Kosovo War. Its 
authors convinced themselves in that context that wars could now be waged 
only on behalf of some version of universal right, and that in this sense some 
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kind of global polity had already  become fact.vii   They distinguish their 
concept of ‘Empire’ as a universal polity, from the European colonial empires, 
and from those  respects in which the current world,  dominated by the United 
States of America,  still resembles a conventional empire in some respects. viii   
The difference between ‘Empire’ in their new sense, and the European 
empires, is that the European empires defined themselves in relation to the 
‘other’ and inferior peoples whom they subjugated, and were also of course in 
competition with one another.  The emerging ‘global’ Empire has no ‘other’.ix  
Just as capitalism as Marx predicted is now incorporating the entire globe into 
its systems, so the global polity is becoming similarly inclusive.  In their own 
way, Hardt and Negri share the view of  defenders of global capitalism such 
as Francis Fukuyama that ‘the end of history’ has now arrived, since in their 
view there is now nothing significant that lies outside the existing regimes of 
production and governance.   
 
Just as with the internal order of states Hardt and Negri distinguish between 
alienating forms of sovereignty, and a revolutionary humanist order which 
presupposes government as a process of self-realisation, so they distinguish 
between two traditions of international governance. One - the order of 
sovereign nation states promulgated in the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 – 
confines sovereignty within structured territorial domains. The other, the idea 
of ‘perpetual peace’ defined by Kant, imagines a universal order governed by 
common norms and entitlements, which morally override the claims of 
sovereign governments.  They argue that this latter  conception is beginning 
to become a reality as a consequence of a unified global economic order, and 
the weakening and mutual interdependence of individual nation-states, in face 
of problems which confront them all.  Their position recalls the arguments of 
writers such as David Held, x who have drawn attention to the vast increase in  
inter-governmental organisations and treaties in recent years,  and to the 
increased sway of international law, as evidence that a new era of global 
governance is dawning.  Hardt and Negri attach considerable importance to 
the United Stations, flawed though it is, to the role of NGOs, and to the theory 
and  practice of international jurists, in making this case.  
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They provide an unconvincingly rosy description of the uniqueness of the 
constitutional basis of the United States to justify the view that the hegemony 
of the United States today is different from that of earlier empires.  Its 
constitution is expansive and inclusive, rather than restrictive and exclusive. 
Its idea of a balance of constitutional powers, which they compare with   the 
model of  constitutional balance which Polybius saw embodied in ancient 
Rome, leads them to advance the American Republic as a form of post-
sovereign government, in which ‘the multitude’ expresses its powers through 
different contesting and complementary agencies, (the federal principle, and 
the famous separation of powers)  and does not surrender or delegate them 
to some separate and other entity.  This seems, as a description of current  
corrupted and plutocratic United States constitutional practice,  quite 
preposterous.  
 
Although there are some parallels between Hardt’s and Negri’s account of the 
emerging global order, and those of liberal internationalists such as Giddens 
and Held, they differentiate their own position from this more meliorist one. 
Whereas the liberal tradition looks forward to a regulated system of 
sovereignties, all subject to the sway of some universal juridical and ethical 
principles, Hardt and Negri hold the door open to a more total system-
transformation, between what one might call actually-existing Empire and  
post-Empire.   The global diffusion of information, and the repossession of 
powers by subjects within the new systems of  non-material production and 
internalised regulation, creates the possibility for new kinds of resistance and 
indeed uprising.  They draw a striking analogue between the transformation of 
the universal  aspiration of the ancient Roman Empire to constitute all of the 
civilised world  into the universalist  and inclusive claims of Christianity for 
equality before God (of all believers, one should add) and what might now  be 
possible in terms of mobilisation  within the emergent order of global empire. 
To put this in an older terminology, the multitude which is being constituted by 
the global capitalist world order as a class in itself, can now seize the moment 
to assert itself as a class for itself.  Hardt’s and Negri’s  view that the erosion 
of traditional forms of mediation and boundary (those of state sovereignty for 
example)  constitute opportunities for new forms of collective recognition and 
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mobilisation make them emphatically  repudiate any form of radical politics 
that looks backwards historically, even to  past  moments of relative success. 
They reject any politics based on nostalgia for earlier compromises, for 
example those achieved within national welfare states.  They share with the 
post-socialists of the Third Way the view that we now have to accept a new 
individualised, globalised, networked society as the only possible basis for 
future action, though  the action they envisage is apocalyptic where the 
reformist post-socialists seek only  to mitigate and regulate somewhat the 
turbulences of global capitalism, to which they envisage no conceivable  
alternative. xi 
 
The Politics of Empire  
 
How should we assess  this ambitious account of  our situation, and what 
conclusions from it can we draw  in regard to questions of agency?  
 
Hardt’s and Negri’s description of the major trends of development of both the 
capitalist economy, and of its major forms of governance, is plainly in accord 
with much current  analysis of globalisation.  Shifts  between economic 
sectors, the dominant role of the information economy,  the ‘subjectivisation’ 
of life, not least through the salience of consumption, and the weakening of 
insulating and defensive boundaries of many kinds, including those provided 
by the nation state at its zenith, are well attested, and are now almost an 
orthodoxy in social theory.  The contentious issue is not whether a 
transformation and hegemonisation of consumer capitalism has been taking 
place, but whether this justifies the political argument that Hardt and Negri 
draw from it, to the effect that the economic system has now generated a  
universal proletariat.  
 
A similar question can be asked about the erosion of sovereignty, and the 
exposure of populations to the effects of more geographically distant forms of 
power, though markets of many kinds, the global flows of information, people,  
commodities, etc. Is this to be understood, as Hardt and Negri suggest, as a 
potentially liberating process,  since it constitutes a potentially unified 
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multitude in place of discrete, non-communicating and often mutually hostile 
segments? Does the fact that more than ever before populations inhabit ‘the 
same world’ – that is to say the same complex open system – signify that they 
do or can acquire a common consciousness  as universal citizens or 
labourers?  Do Hardt and Negri successfully refute  the   alternative, more 
pessimistic view,  which is that these homogenising factors have created not  
a  creative and co-operative multitude, but an atomised ‘mass society’, 
vulnerable more than ever before to manipulation from above?  
 
Although Hardt and Negri do pose the problematic of the transformation of 
Empire in somewhat traditional terms, in their evocations of a universal 
proletariat and ‘common multitude’, there is a contradiction between their  
post-Marxist but still in some ways traditional  formulation of directional 
change, and the forms of  social action to which their analysis actually points. 
Although they posit a potential unity of the subjugated, the examples of radical 
action which they cite are anything but unitary.  Melville’s Bartleby, Coetzee’s 
Michael X, the International Workers of the World,  myriad refugees and 
migrant labourers, St Francis of Assisi and St  Augustine are  figures who 
have little  in common, except being  instances of ‘constituent’ (or 
prefigurative) activity, in some instances  the activity  of resistance or bare 
survival.  Hardt and Negri are  hostile to all constituted limits to human action 
– to the principle of authority itself – and it follows that any political movement 
which began to constitute itself as a positive programme, with its own 
embryonic institutions, would become deeply self-contradictory in their eyes.   
 
There is a kind of social action which does follow from this description of 
society. It  self-active, self-constituting, often negative, highly competitive, 
driven by the desire for free expression and power.  The  22-year old graduate 
who sets up his own computer business in Silicon Valley may be  as much as 
exemplar of this spirit as the NGO worker trying to alleviate a famine, though  
their  ethics  are different. Some change in the postmodern world  is indeed 
transmitted by these ‘rhizomatic’ means, by networks, and the virus-like 
replication and  mutation of kinds of actions  outside the control of formal 
structures and hierarchies. This is the sociological truth of Hardt’s and Negri’s 
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account.  The political appeal of their analysis, its natural constituency so to 
speak, is to those called by ‘desire’ in its various forms, and  moved by 
hostility to restriction and restraint, not to the would-be builders of new 
systems and structures.   Global capitalism has been the bringer of this 
condition of  freedom. It is this which has created, against the opposition of 
sovereignties, the ‘smooth space’ in which  fluidity and mobility become a 
general condition of life. Hardt and Negri are antagonistic to capitalism, but 
how could the  boundary-free space which they celebrate survive without it?    
  
The Question of Human Nature   
 
One  issue in coming to conclusions about the consequences of the loss of 
boundaries is the contribution which the  innate  features of human nature 
make to social arrangements.  Hardt and Negri take a postmodern view of this 
question, arguing that human nature is a legacy of modern ‘dualisms’ which 
postulated ‘outsides’ to human freedom in order to justify imposing limits to 
it.xii Although they may therefore regard the idea of human nature as  
outmoded, they  make the assumption  
 
 that  given freedom and creative possibility,  human beings will construct a 
co-operative and expressive world.  The fact that people  have not always 
acted in this spirit  is not  to be explained by inherent ambivalence in the 
innate human inputs, but by defective, alienating,  and exploitative social 
arrangements. ‘Man is born free, but everywhere is in chains’,  would be one 
way of putting their underlying assumption. xiii 
 
Consider in this connection Hardt’s and Negri’s challenging account of the 
Thermidorian defeat of revolutionary humanism in the early years of the 
Enlightenment.  (This is one of the  fertile avenues for thought opened up by 
this  book, incidentally).  Hardt and Negri seek to rescue the revolutionary 
tradition of republican self-determination,  closely linked with Machiavelli, from 
neglect, and from its customary subordination to positivistic theories of law 
and sovereignty.xiv  They do not however ask why this defeat took place, and 
why the arguments of the Hobbesian tradition (or of defences of the state in 
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other traditions, such as that of Hegel) have in fact proved so historically 
effective.  
 
Marxism did offer one persuasive explanation of why these successive 
defeats of universal aspirations, embodied in the experience of successive 
emergent social classes,  had taken place. His explanation  focused on the 
effects of scarcity, in making unavoidable the appropriation of the means of 
production by the collective self-interest of  classes, rather than by humanity 
as a whole. Thus, once scarcity had been overcome by the full development 
of the means of production, there was reason to believe that this usurpation of 
the general interest by sectional classes could  be transcended.  Although this 
argument does not explain as much as Marxists supposed, and although its 
use  as a justification for political action has often been both reductionist and  
oppressive,  it nevertheless retains considerable explanatory force. It is, for 
example, impossible to imagine any inclusive democratic world system being 
established whilst the differences in economic well-being between peoples 
remain as they are.   
 
Hardt and Negri do not however deploy this long-established Marxian 
theorem. (Perhaps they take it  as a given). Instead, they are more interested 
in what happens in the domain of desire, will, understanding and affect,  and 
in what can be expected from transformations at this level. This element of 
their argument comes from a quite different tradition, via the work of Foucault 
and Deleuze and Guattari.  Its earlier origins lie  in writers such as  Nietzsche 
and Bergson. What one might call its ‘energetics’ – the idea of a potential 
transformative force of will of the multitude – comes from  this source, though 
it is transformed in Hardt and Negri’s communist hands into a benign form 
which assumes that external  obstacles removed, human beings could then  
flower, in all their  potential differences,  in co-operative  harmony with one 
another.  
 
Suppose, however, that this underlying view of human nature is flawed and 
partial? And not only  partial but also  internally contradictory, since the 
marriage that Hardt and Negri attempt to effect between what one might think 
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of as the ‘right’ and ‘left’ strands of their own  theoretical formation (the 
Nietzschean and the Marxist) is given no explanation or justification.  This is 
indeed a rather common contradiction in post-modern social theory, in which 
a radical leftist ‘structure of feeling’ has survived the demolition or 
abandonment of most of the beliefs (e.g. concerning human nature, 
determining structures, objective realities) on which transformative left politics 
originally depended, and perhaps must depend.   We do indeed have to 
decide what we think human nature brings to the world  before we can hope 
to understand what kind of world  it can be. 
 
Deleuze and Guattari, important sources for Hardt and Negri, conducted a 
brilliant and witty critique of Freud and Lacan,  in their Anti-Oedipus,  whose 
central argument was that psychoanalysis had wrongly endorsed the 
inevitability of repression in its account of human development, and had 
condensed into its model of a necessary  Oedipal renunciation in each 
generation the wider system of social authority – the ‘law of the father’, in 
Lacanian terms. They sought to rewrite psychoanalysis as one might say from 
the perspective of the id,  invoking ‘desiring machines’ as potential subjects. .  
 
Freud, however,  thought there was an inherent  problem in the regulation and 
reconciliation of human desires, both between and within generations. His 
actual position was so not different from that of  Hardt’s and Negri’s hero, 
Spinoza, in arguing that it was only understanding that could render such 
choices and renunciations tolerable both for individuals and for society.   
Melanie Klein clarified these issues further in her investigations of early  life, 
and through her discovery  of the dual drives or emotions of love and hate in 
the infant (she thought the balance of these was positively or negatively 
inflected by environment and nurture, but not solely an outcome of this), and  
the prevalence of anxiety as a basic human  propensity. This Kleinian 
position, as I have tried to argue elsewhere, provides an essential foundation 
for  political theory.xv  It is necessary, that is to say, to take account of both the 
negative and destructive potentials of human nature, as well as of its positive 
and creative potentials, in considering the systems of social organisation that 
could bring about a better human existence.     
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The Hobbesian account of the state of nature, as a war of all against all,   
places its weight on the destructive side of this necessary dualism, and no 
‘progressive’ social thinking can be based on that foundation. It is however as 
well to remember that Hobbes’s account does address a part of reality – it 
describes what can happens if destructive forces are given full reign and  no 
authority exists to contain them.  It demonstrates that the minimum and 
necessary role of government is always  to keep the peace and ensure 
security of life. One reason why the ‘revolutionary humanist’ tradition lost out 
to its Thermidorian rival is because this situation of fear and anxiety often  
obtained in reality, and sovereign authority had some effectiveness  and won 
some consent in dealing with it. 
 
 
The problem with Hardt and Negri’s unrealistically positive  view of human 
motivation is that such idealisation is unavoidably accompanied by what 
Kleinian psychoanalysts called a splitting of good and bad, love and hate, the  
destructive and the creative. In Hardt’s and Negri’s argument, this splitting 
involves  the location of all  destructive forces in  external authorities and of all 
creative powers in subjugated individuals.  Such demonisation of authority, 
and idealisation of its opponents, is a dangerous guide to political practice.  
 
 
The Political Conjuncture of Empire 
 
This brings us to the political moment of Hardt’s and Negri’s book, which they 
explain to us  ‘was begun well after the end of the Persian Gulf War, and 
completed well before the beginning of the war in Kosovo.’  (Preface, xvii). It 
was  published in 2000   before the events of September 11 2001.  I think this 
timing must now influence one’s reading of their argument.  
 
The success the United States may have had in the Gulf War crisis in 
presenting itself ‘as the only power  able to manage international justice not 
as a function of its own national motives but in the name of global right.’ 
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(P.180) has not been repeated in the aftermath of September 11. Nor is it any 
longer obvious, as Hardt and Negri put it in discussing the Vietnam War that  
‘the Tet offensive……marked the irreversible military defeat of the U.S. 
imperialist adventures.’  The idea that the United States, unique among 
preponderant powers, depends on international consent and on universalist 
criteria to legitimate what it does, and is constrained by a new form of ‘Empire’ 
is at this point unconvincing.  The present United States government seems 
rather to have interpreted September 11 as an opportunity to demonstrate 
that its Vietnam defeat was an aberration – mainly the result of its  own 
inhibitions and miscalculations – and that in future its military power can and 
will be deployed effectively wherever it is necessary. The ‘peace’ that the 
present US administration seeks to enforce refers  to the suppression or 
deterrence of its own supposed enemies, and seems to have no more general  
meaning than this. Its unilateralism is a direct repudiation of the universalist 
principles and practice that Hardt and Negri hailed as definitive of the 
governmental norms  of ‘Empire’, in contrast to previous empires. At the very 
least, they have been premature in their welcoming of a new  kind of world 
order. 
 
One also needs to review the larger dynamics of September 11 and its 
aftermath  in the light of Hardt’s and  Negri’s analysis.  Unfortunately, when 
one considers the kinds of  political action that might be expected to take 
place in the ‘smooth’ interconnected spaces of Empire, by globalised, 
subjectively empowered, rhizomatic networks, Al Quaida seems to qualify for 
inclusion as well  as  NGO volunteers or journalists working in disaster 
areas.xvi  Hardt and Negri say, evoking Nietzsche, that  ‘a new nomad horde, 
a new race of barbarians, will arise to invade or evacuate Empire’. (P. 213). 
They refer, quoting Walter Benjamin, to a ‘positive barbarism’, which, coming 
from a ‘poverty of experience’  has ‘to begin anew, to begin from the new. ….. 
What exists, he reduces to rubble, not for the sake of the rubble but for that of 
the way leading through it. The new barbarians destroy with affirmative 
violence, and trace new paths of life through their own material existence.’ (P. 
215). It is unfortunately  clear how references to ‘rubble’  may be read at this  
time, long after they were written.  
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Hardt and Negri however make few useful distinctions between what kinds of 
interventions against Empire they are anticipating or inviting.  In their 
concluding invocations of militancy (pp 411-3), they refer to the ‘virtues of 
insurrectional action of two hundred years of experience,’ to the organisers of 
the IWW, to  St Francis of Assisi and ‘his joyous life including all of being and 
nature,’  and to the idea of turning ‘rebellion into a project of love.’  But  there 
can be no serious political action which does not take such differences 
seriously.  The  interventions of NGO volunteers, investigative journalists, or 
jurists, in a crisis such as Ruanda or Kosovo, evoke responses of indignation, 
compassion and solidarity, which are supportive of the recognition and 
enforcement of global ethical norms. More violent interventions tend to 
generate paranoid and vengeful reactions among both peoples  and their 
governments. Such reactions are now authorising possible military action by 
the United States against no less than seven nations. The problem with the 
open, unstructured, globalised universe which Hardt and Negri celebrate is 
that it is liable to generate many different kinds of ‘insurrectionary’ action, 
which may include the various modes of  carnival,  witness, reparation, and 
terror.  Such actions may be visionary and prefigurative, or largely  
destructive.   The unstable and volatile ‘Empire’ that Hardt and Negri describe 
may be capable of being transformed in different ways, in the direction of the 
benign global governance they describe in their early chapters, and in the 
direction of extreme violence and retribution.  These are alternative 
possibilities that Hardt and Negri do not explore, though they have now been 
brought into high focus by the events of September 11.   
 
The Psychosocial Consequences of Capitalism 
 
A third major problem in Hardt’s and Negri’s argument is its underestimation 
of the problems which capitalism  poses to the possibility of  the  inclusive and 
generous society they wish to see. Probably because of their postmodern 
rejection of materialist explanation, they underestimate the  dominating power 
of capital, deterritorialised or not (it is much less deterritorialised than the 
authors suggest), and of its role as a covert ruling power. If the power of 
 16 
capital continues to constrain most forms of action across the globe, it matters 
little if it is now exercised in  more  abstract,  spaceless,  and invisible ways. 
The  ‘destructuration’ and loss of boundaries brought about by global capital  
brings its  dangers as well as liberatory possibilities.  New ‘transversal’ 
syntheses,  hybrids and mobilities of kinds are indeed a product of a  more 
open and interpenetrated environment, and Hardt’s and Negri’s  postmodern 
celebration of this diversity has its point.  But what can  follow from the  
weakness of  containing structures – whether provided by nation states, firms, 
unions, governments, families, or territorial communities – is not a new sense 
of freedom,  but  intensified levels of anxiety, expressed as hostility towards  
foreigners, enemies, migrants, differences of all kinds.  This feeling of 
vulnerability and exposure to danger explains both the current conformist 
mood of American public opinion in relation to its perceived enemies, and the 
xenophobic shift to the right which is taking place among voters across 
Europe. The idea that such states of uncertainty and fear are likely to lead to 
new global solidarities, and to support for Hardt’s and Negri’s ‘transitional 
programme’ xvii is  improbable.  
 
Capitalism is an engine which generates anxiety and fear as  its normal 
concomitants. Its continuous invasion of limits and boundaries  (which Hardt 
and Negri hail as a progressive,  since it has already destroyed the European 
colonial empires and is now including the peoples of the entire globe in the 
‘new proletariat’) exposes not only labourers and citizens but even  capitalists 
themselves to continuous risk and danger.  Individuals and groups may react 
to these threats in the universalist and solidaristic ways that Hardt  and Negri 
hope for, but there are other possibilities and precedents. Further, aggression 
is an instinct  necessary for survival in the capitalist market, and the more 
exposed the markets,  the greater the pressures to be aggressive. The 
violence of which a nation such as the United States is capable,  both  
towards its own deviants and its perceived external enemies, derives from its 
own dominant principle of existence.  It has seemed surprising that the 
triumph of global capitalism over its communist rival in 1989 should have been 
followed by an  intensification, rather than a diminution of fear and anxiety. 
We have never been in greater danger than now, President Bush has recently 
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said, which considering that the earlier danger was of massive nuclear attack 
is paradoxical.xviii  It may even be  that the more unfettered and triumphant 
capitalism is, the higher the levels of underlying anxiety  and fear to which it 
gives rise.  This may also explain why it is that U.S. administrations which 
have been most fundamentalist in their commitments to capitalism, and least 
influenced by countervailing values,  have also been the most paranoid in 
their views of the world. 
 
Hardt and Negri draw attention to an emergent state of de-structuration, as 
the Communist Manifesto’s aphorism ‘all that is solid melts into air’ is nearer 
to becoming reality.  They may however  misjudge  its most likely outcomes.  
Unstable, exposed  and turbulent states more often lead to catastrophic than 
utopian outcomes.  September 11 may yet prove to have been the triggering 
event of just such a destabilisation.  An awakening and  insurgency of the 
multitude is one possible consequence of such a situation, but it seems  an 
unlikely one. Alternatively, the outcome  of September 11 could  yet prove to 
be a  Third World War, arising perhaps from the kinds of serial blunderings   
that led to the Great War in 1914.  There is little sign that these authors, 
admittedly at a more peaceful time of writing, had these  darker possibilities of 
Empire in their minds.  
                                            
i
 Some of these have been set out in the writers’ earlier works, e.g.  A. Negri (1989) The 
Politics of Subversion: a Manifesto for the Twenty-First Century. Trans. J, Newall; Oxford: 
Polity Press: A.. Negri (1991), The Savage Anomaly, trans. M Hardt, Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press; M. Hardt and  A. Negri (1994) Labor of Dionysus. Minneapolis: 
Minnesota University Press;. P. Virno and M.Hardt (eds) (1996). Radical Thought in Italy.  
Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press.  
ii
 A curious feature of their argument is that whereas Marx thought the road to class solidarity 
and revolution lay in the socialisation of the production process, Hardt and Negri derive this 
possibility from what is in many an respects an  individualisation of the labour process.  
iii
 So far as those who work in these systems are concerned, the  evidence is that these 
'interiorised forms of control' are effective rather than otherwise. The training and compliance 
procedures now ubiquitous in their management - competency-based learning, quality-
assurance and the like -  impose tight control on these labour processes, and are inimical to 
free thinking.     
iv
 This is a reference to Deleuze and Guattari’s book of that title.  
v
 See David Byrne, Complexity Theory and the Social Sciences.  
vi
 The difference in tone and assumption between these sections is very striking, and 
suggests that it may derive from  differences of approach between the two authors.  
vii
 The importance of the Gulf War derives rather from the fact that it presented the United 
States as the only power able to manage international justice not as a function of its own 
national motives but in the name of global right.’ (P. 180). 
viii
 There are of course important differences between the forms of territorial  domination 
effected by the United States, and by the European colonial empires. But at this point these 
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seem to have more to do with strategic interests and forms of mediating power (capital, long 
distance weaponry, the purchase of governments, in contrast to trade and direct territorial 
occupation), than with the contrast Hardt and Negri seek to make between old imperial power 
and some new deterritorialised form of global order.  
ix
 In fact it is has been constructing Islam as an other for itself, indicating that ‘otherness’ 
continues to have its uses.   
x
 See Held D., McGrew A., Goldblatt, D., Perraton, J.  Global Transformations                         
Polity  1999 
xi
 Hardt and Negri are not only hostile to defensive nationalisms, but also show no interest in 
the construction of new governmental frames like that of the European Union through which 
peoples might be defended from market risks and uncertainties. Within their framing of the 
issue, the most ‘modern’ society, whose members come nearest to constituting the new 
‘multitude’, seems on the contrary to be that of the United States.  
xii
 They quote (P. 187) Frederick Jameson.  ‘Postmodernism’ is what you have when the 
modernisation process is complete and nature is gone for good.’   
xiii
 They are however critical of Rousseau, regarding his concept of the ‘general will’ as a 
conservative, proto-nationalist idea.   
xiv
 They follow Gramsci  (The Modern Prince) in finding in Machiavelli the key source for a 
modern theory of consensual self-government.  
xv
 See M.J. Rustin (1981) The Good Society and the Inner World. London: Verso;  M.J. Rustin 
(2001) Reason and Unreason. London: Continuum.  
xvi
 Manual Castells, in the second volume of his Information Age trilogy, was prescient in 
recognising that social movements came in many varieties, progressive and reactionary.  
xvii
 Its components are ‘the right to global citizenship’, ‘the right to a social wage’,  and ‘the 
right to reappropriation’  (of the means of production).  The right to education and information 
might usefully be added to this list.  
xviii
 It is noteworthy that a concept of security based on mutual deterrence served to manage  
anxieties about the Soviet Union, within that rather highly structured contest, but is deemed 
irrelevant to the containment of so relatively weak a nation as Iraq. 
